

## IX.—Heraclitus on God and the Phenomenal World

(Frag. 67 Diels)

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According to the fragment, all the contraries coincide in God. The various phenomena of the universe are mere modifications of the one deity. God alone is essential; the single things are nothing but accidental qualities temporarily assumed by Him. God is unspecific but at the same time lends vigor and energy to any specific fact. He unfolds His eternal self in a continuous process of transitory individuation.

The paramount concern of the early Greek philosophers was metaphysics. Our doxographical tradition misrepresents their doctrines by laying stress on the physical rather than the metaphysical aspect of what they taught and preached, and consequently we are poorly informed about essential points. In our own time, the great editor of the *Doxographi Graeci* and of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, a man keenly interested in science and its contemporary progress, shared the views of ancient doxography. The task for us, therefore, is to return to a more adequate appreciation of early Greek metaphysics, though we are handicapped by the dearth of authentic evidence. This scarcity however is an incentive for paying the most careful attention to what little evidence we have at our disposal.

As to Heraclitus, we are fortunate enough to possess at least one original fragment dealing with this fundamental question of metaphysics: What is the relation between the Absolute and the Relative, between the One and the Many, between God and the Phenomenal World?

The fragment,<sup>1</sup> as given by Hippolytus,<sup>2</sup> reads: 'Ο θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός—τάναντία ἅπαντα

<sup>1</sup> Frag. 67 H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>5</sup> (Berlin, Weidmann, 1935), 165.

<sup>2</sup> Hippolytus *Ref. Haer.* ix.10.

(οὗτος ὁ νοῦς), ἀλλοιοῦται δέ, ὅκωσπερ . . . ὅπότεν συμμιγῇ θνώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου. "God is day night, winter summer, war peace, plenty hunger—all the contraries, this is what is meant, and He undergoes changes—as . . . (lacuna) when blended with θνώματα, receives different names according to the scent of each single one."

The first part of the fragment states the identity of the one God with four pairs of contraries. In order to understand this, we have to remember, first, that Heraclitus describes all objects and all processes in terms of contraries, so that whatever is or happens in this our world is said to be produced and to live through interaction of contraries. In the second place, Heraclitus considers it to be his greatest discovery that in any pair of contraries the two partners are identical with one another: day is night, and life is death, and fire turns into water, and water into earth.<sup>3</sup> Our fragment now takes the third step and tells us that several pairs of contraries coincide with one another in the One, in God. Not only is war and strife identical with peace and harmony, and plenty with hunger, but also war-peace is identical with repletion-hunger, and so forth. The higher unit in which they find themselves combined is God.

This statement is followed in our text by words which obviously do not form a part of the quotation. Some scholiast has stepped in and inserted the explanatory remark: "All the contraries; this is what is meant."<sup>4</sup> The explanation is no doubt correct: the contraries mentioned by Heraclitus are only examples. They stand for all the other pairs of contraries as well and represent whatever goes into the making

<sup>3</sup> For chains of three members (fire-water-earth) in Heraclitus, with both the first and last terms opposed to the middle term, cf. "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *A.J.P.* LIX (1938), 309 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Heidel (see note 11) gives everything to Heraclitus and, changing οὗτος ὁ νοῦς into ὠντὸς ὁ νοῦς, translates: "opposites quite, but the sense is the same." Apart from other objections (the article in *ῥάναντλα*, the asyndeton in ὠντὸς ὁ νοῦς, etc.), such a use of the word νοῦς (abstract and objective 'significance', instead of 'intended meaning') is unparalleled in early Greek and improbable in itself.

of our phenomenal world. The whole universe with all its amazing variety somehow coincides with the one God: ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα (frag. 10). But how precisely, in what way and manner, does God unfold Himself in the universe? This question is answered in the latter part of the fragment.

The latter part begins with the words ἀλλοιοῦται δέ, i.e. God undergoes changes, He turns into the different things or events and takes on different aspects. I hesitate however to consider these words as authentic, and would ascribe them rather to the scholiast.<sup>5</sup>

Truly Heraclitan again is the Ionic ὅκωσπερ and the comparison introduced by ὅκωσπερ. The comparison ought to give us the information we are seeking and to explain how the one and same God is contained in the various phenomena. But unfortunately the decisive word has dropped out from our MS tradition. God is said to be connected with the single

<sup>5</sup> The words ἀλλοιοῦται δέ are suspect for two reasons. (1) What the text requires would in plain Attic read thus: ὦν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ, ἀλλοιοῦται ἐκάστοτε τό τ' εἶδος καὶ τοῦνομα. The mere ἀλλοιοῦται δέ fails to meet this minimum requirement; the expression is incomplete, inaccurate and illogical, in contrast to the careful phrasing of comparisons in frags. 1, 5 (*bis*), 90, 114. (2) Some denominative verbs in -όω occur from Homer on, especially in the middle and passive voices (cf. J. Wackernagel, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer* [Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1916], 122 ff.); but not before the latter part of the 5th century were such verbs freely fashioned in large numbers. There is no trace of ἀλλοιόω prior to the *Corpus Hippocr.* (many instances), Eurip. (only *Suppl.* 944), and Thuc. (only II.59) (cf. Ernst Fraenkel, *Griech. Denominativa* [Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1906], 117). The synonymous ἐτεροιάω occurs first in Melissus, Herod., and the *Corpus Hippocr.* (cf. Fraenkel 127). The *argumentum ex silentio* carries some weight in this case, because, if the word had been in existence, the Presocratic philosophers would certainly have taken advantage of it. But they did not do so (cf. Kranz' index to the *Vorsokratiker*, vol. III [see note 1]), and used other expressions instead (ἀλλοιοί μετέφυν Empedocles 31.B.108 Diels-Kranz; διὰ χροᾶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν Parmenides 28.B.8, 41). In the language of doxography, on the other hand, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι is the regular term. Our inference is that in the tradition from which Hippolytus drew his quotation, some part of the original, after a very common fashion, had been suppressed and replaced by a trivial and meager paraphrase in the current language of doxography.

phenomena just as—what?—which, when mixed with different *θνώματα* etc.

The meaning of *θνώμα* in classical Greek is 'incense', and consequently *πῦρ* is frequently supplied as the missing word<sup>6</sup>: "Just as fire, when blended with different kinds of incense, receives different names according to the scent of each single one." Many scholars accept this restoration,<sup>7</sup> foremost among them Diels and Burnet. Others however are opposed to it, and with them I think that the suggestion is untenable. For one thing, fire would not be said to be "mixed" with incense.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, the supposed "mixture" results in smoke, and the fragment would thus imply that the smoke is given the different names. This is strange, and in fact untrue. The specific names, such as *λιβανωτός* or *σμήρνα*, do not apply to the smoke but rather to the substances as bought from the dealer and laid on the altar for burning. A simile based on such a distortion of fact would be absurd and confusing, instead of being clear in itself and helpful for the illustration of a hidden metaphysical truth.<sup>9</sup> Other restorations which

<sup>6</sup> According to Heidel (see note 11), Dr. Thomas Davidson was the first to suggest this supplement.

<sup>7</sup> O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* (Leipzig, Dieterich, 1935), 146 ff., discusses the restored text at length without even mentioning the fact that one crucial notion is not based on any tradition at all.

<sup>8</sup> It is true that in Pindar frag. 130 we read *θύα μειγνύντων πυρὶ τηλεφανεί παντοῖα θεῶν ἐπὶ βωμοῖς*. But here the peculiar expression is connected with Pindar's general predilection for verbs with the connotation 'to mix' (cf. F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* [Berlin, Weidmann, 1921], 94 ff.) and has to be explained under this aspect. It is a Pindaric idiom and does not represent regular Greek usage. And Heraclitus is especially unlikely to have spoken of burning in terms of a mixture with fire (cf. frags. 7 and 66). Frag. A 16, 130, to be sure, speaks of the burning coal as "coming in contact" (*πλησιάζαντες*) with fire; but contact is not mixture, and the wording is not the original one. Heraclitus may have used here, as he did in frag. B 26, the word *ἄπτεσθαι*, which combines with the meaning "to come in contact" the connotation "to catch fire".

<sup>9</sup> Nestle (E. Zeller-W. Nestle, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*<sup>6</sup> [Leipzig, Reissland, 1920], 1.834, note) further remarks that fire is inappropriate because "dann die heraklitische Substanz nur unter verschiedenen Bezeichnungen (*θεός*, *πῦρ*) tatsächlich mit sich selbst verglichen würde." I am not quite sure that for Heraclitus fire and God are only different names for the very same thing,

have been attempted, suggesting that the fragment may refer to wine or air rather than fire, or to a mixture of different kinds of incense, are likewise unsatisfactory for various reasons.<sup>10</sup>

There is however a way out of this dilemma. It was indicated by Prof. W. A. Heidel twenty-five years ago,<sup>11</sup> and though I cannot follow him altogether, I feel that he is substantially right. Thus I shall re-examine this part of the fragment on much the same lines, using again most of his evidence and trying to add to it. At the same time however I shall modify both the contention and the arguments to support it, so that the renewal of the attempt can, I hope, be justified.

*Θύωμα* does not necessarily mean incense. We have reliable evidence that the word was used in early Greek in the sense of *ἄρωμα*, i.e. aromatic herb or spice, and likewise in the sense of *μύρον*, i.e. perfume or unguent prepared with aromatic materials.<sup>12</sup> Either thing, the spice or the perfume, could be yet it is certainly true that fire, as compared to God, is not on a par with incense, as compared to war or hunger. The other comparisons of Heraclitus are perfectly balanced.

<sup>10</sup> "Air", suggested by Zeller, is out of the question. "Wine" (Bergk, Schuster, and Brieger) is less open to exception, but the suggestion which I wish to advocate seems to be recommended both by greater intrinsic propriety and by outside evidence. The assumption (R. Scott, Bernays, Bywater) that Heraclitus speaks of a mixture of different incenses puts God on the same level with the phenomena, and the last part of the fragment indicates that in each case only one *θύωμα*, with its one specific *ἡδονή*, is involved.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics," *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* XLVIII (1913), 704-8.

<sup>12</sup> (1) Hesychius has the gloss *θύωμα· μύρον, ἄρωμα*. (2) Athenaeus xv.688d says that the *ἀρώματα* which went into the making of *μύρα* (scented unguents) were formerly called *θυώματα*. (3) Semonides Amorg. frag. 14 (E. Diehl, *Anth. Lyr.* [Leipzig, Teubner, 1935], i.3 p. 60), from Clem. Alex. *Paed.* ii.64.3 and Athen. xv.690c: *κῆλειφόμεν μύροις καὶ θυώμασι καὶ βακκάρι· καὶ γὰρ τις ἔμπορος παρῆν*. The combination of the two general words *μύρα* and *θυώματα* with the special name *βάκκαρις* of one particular *μύρον* or *θύωμα* need not arouse suspicion. Semonides apparently wants to give the impression of an ample variety and wealth of perfumes and therefore accumulates the terms to describe them. Further Athenaeus quotes (690b ff.) three more instances (from Ion, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes) where the special word *βάκκαρις* and the general

described by the same name, exactly as we use a word like 'lavender' for either the shrub or the perfume.

We are thus in a position to make a new start. Perhaps our text can be explained by assuming that it speaks, not of incense and fire, but of perfumes and the materials that go into the making of perfumes. Let us follow this track and see where it leads us.

Perfumes in antiquity were not made and used in the same way as today. Our perfumes contain a highly concentrated extract from the spice and are applied sparingly, a few drops at a time. Ancient perfumes, on the other hand, were evidently much less concentrated and had to be applied in larger quantities. A considerable part of the body was anointed with the substance.<sup>13</sup> We recall in this connection that anointing the body was a common practice throughout antiquity, quite independent of the use of perfumes. Oil was rubbed into the skin, and this oil had about the same function that soap has today. As early as Homer we find that occasionally a scenting ingredient was blended with the oil.<sup>14</sup> Thus perfumes could be thought of, and were indeed thought of, as modifications, through the addition of some specific scent, of plain oil<sup>15</sup>—just as the particular facts of the world, day and

word *μύρον* appear side by side: *βακκάρεις τε καὶ μύρα* etc. (4) Hippocr. *Γυναικ.* II.209 (8, 404 L) (quoted, as well as the Hesychius gloss, by Heidel): *ἐψέιν τὰ θνώματα ἃ ἐς τὸ μύρον ἐμβάλλεται*. (5) Cf. also *τεθνωμένα (εἴματα)* "perfumed with flower essences," *Cypria apud Athen.* xv.682f. (H. von Fritze, *Die Rauchopfer bei den Griechen* [Berlin, Mayer and Müller, 1894], 5), and *Iliad* xiv.172; see note 14.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. e.g. the quotations in *Athen.* xii.553a-e. The perfumes, as a rule, were in liquid form. Viscous unguents were an exception, cf. *Pliny Nat. Hist.* xiii.21: *quosdam crassitudo maxime delectat, spissum appellantes, linique iam, non solum perfundi, unguentis gaudent.*

<sup>14</sup> *Iliad* xiv.171 ff.: (*Ἥρη*) *ἀλείψατο δὲ λίπ' ἐλαίῳ ἀμβροσίῳ ἔδανφ', τό ῥά οἱ τεθνωμένον* (cf. note 12, 5) *ἦεν· τοῦ καὶ κινυμένοιο Διὸς κατὰ χαλκοβατὲς δῶ ἔμπης ἐς γαῖαν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἔκετ' ἀντμή. Il. xxiii.186:* (Aphrodite anoints Hector's corpse) *ροδόνετι ἐλαίῳ*.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Plut. Vita Alex.* 40.1; *Philonides apud Athen.* xv.692a-b; *Virgil Georg.* II.465 (description of rural simplicity): *alba nec Assyrio fucatur lana veneno, nec casia liquidi corrumpitur usus olivi.* Virgil's couplet is an ad-

night, peace and war, repletion and hunger, can be understood as modifications of the essence of the universe, of God. Is it this, perhaps, that our text tries to make clear? And, if our guess is correct: what else does Heraclitus indicate through the simile of the oil in perfumes?

Perfumes were prepared by blending oil with some scenting ingredient.<sup>16</sup> The ingredients were known as *ἡδύσματα*,<sup>17</sup> 'sweetenings', and the term fits in very well with the word *ἡδοναί*, 'sweetnesses' used by Heraclitus for the different odors. The oil itself was carefully selected for this purpose as having no odor of its own to interfere with the smell of the scenting ingredient. Theophrastus states that the oil has to be as "odorless" (*ἄωδες*), or, more accurately, as "unspecific" (*ἄειδες*) as possible in its smell.<sup>18</sup> Thus we have a blending of an unspecific medium, the same in all cases, with particular and specific factors, varying from case to case. Changing and accidental properties are bestowed on a neutral and essential carrier. The simile is indeed appropriate for elucidating the way in which God enters into His various manifestations.

mirable adaptation of what we read in the original Greek in Plut. *Aporoth. Lacon.* 18 p. 228 b (almost identical with Athen. xv.686f.): τὸ μὲν μύρον ἐξήλασεν (Λυκοῦργος) ὡς τοῦ ἐλαίου φθορὰν καὶ θλεθρον, τὴν δὲ βαφικὴν ὡς κολακείαν αἰσθησέως (ὡς ἀφανίζοντας τὴν λευκότητα τῶν ἐρίων Athen.). Further evidence, with reference both to wool and oil: Herodotus 3. 22. 1 and 3; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 48 p. 344. With reference to oil alone: Chrysippus *apud* Athen. 1. cit. (= *Stoic. Vet. Fragmenta* ed. von Arnim [Leipzig, Teubner, 1903], iii.200 fg. 12); Seneca *Nat. Quaest.* i.vb.13.8; Ps. Heraclitus *Epist.* vii p. 75, 11 Bywater (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1887): τὰς τῶν ἐλαίων φθορὰς ἐν μύροις. Cf. also Xenophon *Conv.* 2.3-4 (A. Körte, "Aufbau und Ziel von Xenophons Symposium," *Sächs. Sitz.-Ber.* [1927], 8f.).—Some of the quotations I owe to A. S. Pease, Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *R.E.*, xvii.2465, 15. His articles on *Ölbaum* and *Oleum*, and Hug's article on *Salben* were very helpful.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* xiii.1.7: Ratio faciendi (*scil.* unguenta) duplex: sucus et corpus. Ille olei generibus fere constat, hoc odorum. Haec styymmata vocant, illa hedysmata. Theophr. *De Odor.* § 8: Παντὸς μύρον ἢ χρίσματος ἢ σύνθεσις αὕτη, *scil.* ξηροῖς (the scenting ingredients) πρὸς ὕγρὰ. § 14: διόπτει (τὰ μύρα) εἰς τοῦλαιον τίθενται. Cf. also Athen. xv.686f., etc.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Pliny (preceding note), and Hippocrates *Γυναικ.* ii.202 (8 p. 386 L): ἡδύσματα ἃ ἐς τὸ μύρον ἐμβάλλεται.

<sup>18</sup> Theophr. *De Odor.* § 16: τὸ ἀσμώτατον ζητεῖν. § 18: δεῖ ἄωδες εἶναι τὸ δεξιόμενον. § 15: ἔλαιον μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οἰκείωτατον, ἀειδέστατον (cf. § 1) γάρ.

Heraclitus did not possess, and did not care to invent, technical terms such as specific and unspecific, accidental and essential, and so forth. But the comparison with the oil and the perfumes involves, though by implication alone, all the ideas he wanted to impress on his readers. And we may wonder whether he had not in mind one more implication. In Plutarch we find the casual remark that, just as flower-scents are weak in themselves but receive vigor and energy from the oil with which they are blended, so external factors borrow substance and body from the mass of their substratum.<sup>19</sup> Thus the same simile is used again to show the association of accidental factors with a substratum, and this time it is the author's explicit contention that in the combination the substratum is the more powerful agent. No doubt Heraclitus was of the same opinion with reference to God's unfolding in the world. No doubt he believed that it is not the accidental modifiers but God alone who lends substance and body, vigor and energy to the resulting compounds.<sup>20</sup>

The fragment finally states that, as soon as the basic substance has been combined with one of the various scents, man loses sight of its identity. No longer is it called by its own name; the other factor alone provides the name for the compound. This also is in complete agreement with the facts as we know them, provided we take the basic substance to be the oil which goes into the making of perfumes. Unguents were named from their scent <sup>21</sup>: *νάρδιον* (*σμήρνινον* etc.) *μύρον*;

<sup>19</sup> Plut. *De tuenda San.* 10 p. 127b: ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀσμαι καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἀσθενεῖς εἰσι, μυχθεῖσαι δὲ τῷ ἐλαίῳ ῥώμην ἰσχυροῦσι καὶ τόνον, οὕτω ταῖς ἑξωθεν αἰτίαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς οἶον οὐσίαν καὶ σῶμα παρέχει τὸ πλῆθος ὑποκείμενον.

<sup>20</sup> We cannot tell when the simile of the oil in perfumes was first used in the sense it has in Plutarch, but even if this was done long after Heraclitus, the coincidence is remarkable. Should this be the case, the simile has been so developed subsequently that in one more respect it falls in with what Heraclitus believed.

<sup>21</sup> Dioscorides I.42.2. recommends testing the proper preparation of an unguent, before medical application, by its smell, and making sure whether ἀφ' οὗ ἡ κλησίς ἐστι τοῦ μύρου, ἐκείνο ποιεῖ κατὰ τὴν ὁσφρησιν. As the wording shows, Dioscorides takes it for granted that the name of the unguent is determined by the ingredient of which it smells.



or simply *νάρδιον*, or occasionally even *νάρδος*.<sup>22</sup> Rarely is the oil mentioned.<sup>23</sup> The simile implies that likewise, when we speak and think of the events which happen to us and the situations in which we find ourselves, we usually forget to consider them as mere modifications of the one and essential Being, as aspects of God.<sup>24</sup>

It appears that our hypothesis works out rather well and gives a satisfactory meaning to the fragment as we read it. Some hesitation however may arise from a feeling that oil is not a sufficiently dignified substance to serve as a symbol for God. But in antiquity oil was sacrificed to the gods, and perfumes likewise; and oil, applied as an ointment, was supposed to give the body health,<sup>25</sup> vigor, and charm. We only need remember the passages in Homer where a man or god, after having cleansed himself by bathing, is anointed with oil and thus acquires an appearance which strikes with awe and admiration those that behold him.

I am not aware of other relevant objections.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, there is even more evidence at our disposal to support the suggested restoration.

It is the rule in Greek literature that comparisons, after they have once been successfully invented and applied, are used again and again by later writers for similar purposes, not in mechanical repetition but with appropriate adaptation. The passage just quoted from Plutarch is an instance, and it

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. Antiphilus *Anthol. Pal.* vi.250 (*νάρδος* instead of *νάρδιον μύρον*); Aristoph. *Eq.* 1332 (*σμήρνη* for *σμήρνινον*); Strabo 16.1.20 (*σῆσamos* for *σησάμινον*); Theophrastus uses *ἡ κύπρος* parallel with *τὸ ῥόδιον* (*De Odor.* § 25 f.), etc.

<sup>23</sup> Liddell and Scott however quote lxx *Esther* 2.12 *σμήρνινον ἔλαιον*; for *ῥόδον ἔλαιον* in Homer cf. note 14.

<sup>24</sup> *ὀνομάζονται* in the text apparently implies that the things are not in actual fact what we call them. *ὄνομα* has the same implication in Parmenides 8, 38.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. e.g. Athen. *epit.* ii.46f.

<sup>26</sup> It is true that, while *πῦρ* could easily have been omitted, through haplography, after *ἄκωσπερ*, there is no plausible reason for *ἔλαιον* to have dropped out. But we know neither what particular word was used by Heraclitus nor its position. And I do not think that considerations of this kind carry much weight. They can tip the scales only when otherwise the balance is even. Any word can be omitted for no apparent reason.

helps to confirm our explanation of the fragment. But there is another parallel, much closer to the presumed Heraclitan original, in that the simile serves to elucidate a cognate metaphysical theory.

Heraclitus says that the specific names given (*ὀνομάζεται*) to single phenomena (*ἕκαστον*) are deceptive: in reality it is God alone who, in spite of His unvarying self-identity, manifests Himself in all the sets of contraries. Plato, in *Timaeus* 48e ff., denies self-identity to any single phenomenal thing (*ἕκαστα* 49d, 1) known by some specific name, such as e.g. water (*ὁ δὲ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν* 49b, 7), and characterized by the possession of some one or other of the contrary qualities (*τὸ ὁποιοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὀτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκ τούτων* 50a, 2). Such a thing, Plato maintains, cannot strictly speaking be called an object (*τοῦτο* or *τόδε*) but only a modification (*τὸ τοιούτο* 49e–50a). The mere modifications have, according to him, only a transitory, restricted, and relative reality, while the one thing which undergoes the various modifications has a permanent, full, and absolute reality. To illustrate the relationship of the modifications to the modified substance, Plato uses first a simile obviously inspired by Heraclitus frag. 90: the substance is likened to gold and the modifications to shapes given to the gold.<sup>27</sup> Plato then proceeds to describe the permanent and self-identical substance in terms of a medium or recipient in which the phenomena somehow

<sup>27</sup> *Tim.* 50a, 5 ff. Heraclitan (frag. 88) is also the term *μεταπίπτει* in b, 4.—In Heraclitus the analogy was striking and conveyed the idea of equivalence perfectly well: *Πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός*. Plato tries to adapt the comparison to a different conception but is not very successful in doing so. First: why should the material be specifically gold? There is no reason but the reference to Heraclitus, to which indeed the gold gives the clue. Second: as Aristotle has pointed out in *De Gener.* II.329a, 13 ff. (cf. A. E. Taylor, commentary on the *Timaeus* [Oxford Press, 1928], 322 f.), the simile is misleading as to what it is supposed to imply. Third, the man making and remaking mathematical figures out of the same piece of gold is a fiction, while the exchange of gold for objects was one of life's realities. Heraclitus invented his analogies only for frag. 5, where he wanted to ridicule foolishness through nonsensical caricatures.

materialize (ἡ τὰ πάντα δεχομένη σώματα φύσις 50b, 6). The recipient, he goes on to say, (τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένῃ 50e, 5) must be absolutely shapeless (ἄμορφον 50d, 7) and un-specific (πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεῶν 50e, 4) in itself. These expressions remind of what Theophrastus requires for the preparation of unguents: the oil which is to serve as the liquid recipient (τὸ δεχόμενον) has to be as odorless (ἄωδες) and un-specific (ἄειδες) as possible.<sup>28</sup> And indeed, there follows next in Plato's text the simile of the oil in unguents: . . . πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεῶν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένῃ· καθάπερ περὶ τὰ ἀλείμματα ὅποσα εὐώδη τέχνη μηχανῶνται, πρῶτον τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ποιοῦσιν, ὅτι μάλιστα αὔωδη τὰ δεχόμενα ὕγρὰ τὰς ὁσμὰς . . .<sup>29</sup> (50e, 4). "That which is to receive in itself all the types of things must be free from any peculiarity, just as in the technical manufacture of perfumed unguents the first thing is to provide a base of this very kind, that is to have the liquid which is to receive the scents as odorless as possible." Thus the simile as restored in Heraclitus is extant in a parallel speculation of Plato,<sup>30</sup> and we may fairly draw the inference

<sup>28</sup> Cf. note 18.

<sup>29</sup> The sentence as edited by Burnet cannot be construed. At least the punctuation must be changed as has been done above. But in addition I should like to alter ὅποσα and write instead ὅποσοι, corresponding to ὅσοι of the following simile.—I have disregarded the simile of the ἐκμαγεῖον since it has no bearing on the Heraclitus fragment.

<sup>30</sup> Plato used the simile also in *Cratylus* 394a, substituting however drugs for unguents: ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὁσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δὲ γε ἱατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπομένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων, etc. It so happens that *Cratylus* was a Heraclitean. The connection between Heraclitus frag. 67 and the *Cratylus* passage is pointed out by Heidel, *op. cit.* (see note 11), 704 f. (The comparison however, though not of ὀνόματα but of λόγοι, with φάρμακα had been elaborated before by Gorgias in the *Helena*, *Vorsokr.* 82, B 11, 14.) But I cannot follow Heidel when on p. 703 he also connects with the same *Cratylus* passage Heraclitus frag. 48 (τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος) and reads into that fragment Plato's functional teleology as it is implied in the *Cratylus* passage. Ἔργον, as the reality of actions and facts in contrast to mere words, is a very common conception and the context in Heraclitus frag. 48 does not require, more than that. The

that our restoration is correct and that the simile was borrowed by Plato<sup>31</sup> from Heraclitus frag. 67, exactly as Plato's preceding simile was adapted from Heraclitus frag. 90.<sup>32</sup>

Though it is not possible to restore the full original text of the fragment, we can now at least feel sure of its authentic meaning as we have developed it in the course of this discussion. In order to make the implications of the simile explicit, we had to express them in the language of later ages and use words which certainly had no equivalent in Heraclitus' own vocabulary. But apart from the terminology there is, I hope, nothing in our explanation which cannot confidently be ascribed to Heraclitus.

We have thus finally reached a position from which we can view the fragment in its entirety and try to determine its philosophical significance.

As soon as philosophy has reached a certain stage, the idea of the One unfolding itself in the Many is bound to present itself. The idea is the key-note in the early speculation of India, and the *Upanishads*<sup>33</sup> contain many a hymn in honor of the *ātman* or *brahma* and praising it, e.g., as "containing all works, containing all desires; containing all odors, containing

explicit theory that "the true nature of a thing is to be understood in relation to its function or *ἔργον*" is unnecessary for the explanation of Heraclitus frag. 48; it is incompatible with frag. 67 because it would make God's accidental modifications more true and real than his unshaken self-identity.

<sup>31</sup> The simile of the oil in unguents recurs again in Lucretius II.846 ff. For the relationship of Lucretius to Plato cf. Paul Shorey, "Plato, Lucretius, and Epicurus," in *Harvard Studies* XII (1901), 204.

<sup>32</sup> There seem to be more echoes from Heraclitus in Plato's context, though none of the coincidences is necessarily more than accidental. The basic medium is said to be *μεταλαμβάνων ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσασατότατον* (51a, 7); the phraseology may reproduce Heraclitus frag. 18 *ἀνεξερεύνητον ἔον καὶ ἄπορον*. In 52b, 7 ff. the expressions *ἡ ἄνπνος καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσις—ὀνείρωξις, ἐγεροθέντες* may be echoes of Heraclitus frags. 16 *τὸ μὴ δύνον* and 1 *εὔδοντες*.

<sup>33</sup> In what follows I am indebted to Georg Misch's book *Der Weg in die Philosophie* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1926), and to Hermann Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck, 1915).

all tastes; encompassing this whole world.”<sup>34</sup> Unlike the early Greeks, however, the Indians did not explain the phenomenal variety in terms of a few interacting contraries. Rather, in order to achieve exhaustive completeness and stringency, they used long chains of enumerations or deductions. Their closest approach to the Heraclitan type is the pattern “both A and Non-A”, a juxtaposition of a fact and its negation: “Verily, this self is *brahma*, made of . . . energy and non-energy, desire and non-desire, anger and non-anger, righteousness and unrighteousness.”<sup>35</sup> Here at least the last pair has an equivalent in Heraclitus’ statement that before God *δίκαια* and *ἄδικοι* are the same (frag. 102). And the Indians are in complete agreement with Heraclitus when they maintain that the *principia individuationis* are *nāman* and *rūpa*, individual name and individual form. A thing is therefore a particular thing both by virtue of being known by a name of its own (the ‘name’ probably stands also for ‘conception’ or ‘idea’), and by virtue of possessing an appearance distinct from other things. Thus we read: “Verily, at that time, the world was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and form (*nāman* and *rūpa*).”<sup>36</sup> In the Heraclitus fragment,

<sup>34</sup> The complete series of attributes reads thus: *manomayaḥ prāṇacarīro bhārūpaḥ satyasamkalpa ākācātmā sarvakarmā sarvakāmaḥ sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasaḥ sarvam idam abhyātto 'vāky anādaraḥ*. (*Chāndogya Upan.* III.14.2). I quote above from R. E. Hume’s translation (Oxford Press, 1921). The original however can, if at all, only be rendered in a Greek fashioned for the purpose: *νογενής ψυχασώματος φωτοειδής ὀντομέδων αἰθέραντος· πάνεργος πᾶμποθος, πᾶνοδμος πᾶγχυμος, τὸ πᾶν τότε ἀμφισυνειληφώς· ἄφωνος ἀμελής* (= unconcerned). Cf. also the parallel in *Çatapatha Brāhm.* x.6.2.

<sup>35</sup> *sa vā ayam ātmā brahma . . . tejomayo 'tejomayaḥ kāmamayo 'kāmamayaḥ krodhamayo 'krodhamayo dharmamayo 'dharmamayaḥ* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upan.* IV.4.5). By accident, next follows in the text a remark very much like the scholion we found inserted in our Heraclitus fragment 67: “made of everything; this is what is meant by ‘made of this,’ ‘made of that’” (*sarvamayas tad yad etad idaṃmayo 'domaya iti*).

<sup>36</sup> *taddhedam tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt tan nāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyata* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upan.* 1.4.7).—A commentary by Raṅgarāmānuja (Poona, Ānandāçrama series 64, 1911) explains the term *nāman* by “god, man, and so forth” (*nāman* in grammar means noun), but *rūpa* by “making, going, and so

ὀνομάζεται corresponds to *nāman*, and ἡδονὴ ἐκάστου to the individual *rūpa*.

Against this background, the features characteristic of Heraclitus alone will be revealed more clearly. While the Indians are absorbed in the contemplation of the One, the Greek philosopher lays equal emphasis on the actual structure of the phenomenal world,<sup>37</sup> and he claims to have explained, through a classification on natural principles, the exact condition and status of each single thing: ἐγὼ διηγέυμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει (frag. 1). The classification is based on the elaborate system of contraries. The contraries, by their diversity and their strife, create variety, motion, and incessant change even in apparent rest and persistence. But at the same time, the principle of the *coincidentia oppositorum* yokes the conflicting partners together in an antagonistic harmony. This does not mean however that the contraries mutually neutralize one another, so that the balance is zero. With Heraclitus, the balance is positive in each single case: before God, unrighteousness merges in righteousness, and the result is righteousness throughout (frag. 102). And again, when in God all the contraries meet and coincide, not with

forth", a transitive and an intransitive verb. He apparently wishes to imply, and correctly so, that both *nāman* and *rūpa* encompass not objects alone but also actions and all other phenomena. The note reads: devamanuṣyādī-nāmakaracaranādirūpavān ity evaṃ vyākriyatety arthaḥ.

<sup>37</sup> This difference is also responsible for a significant difference in the attitude toward our personal lives. Both the Indians and Heraclitus proclaim the community of the essence of the universe with the core of our ego. But while the Indians enthusiastically, though vaguely, insist on their complete identity ("this Soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice . . . greater than these worlds" *Chānd. Upan.* 3.14.3), for Heraclitus the relationship is more definite and realistic. His logos is, in spite of its organic vitality and unfathomable depth, strictly logical, and it can be expressed in concrete terms comparable to the scientific laws of nature. Since the logos is at the bottom of ourselves no less than of the universe, we have access to its profundities through the shaft of enlightened self-observation (frags. 45, 101). The latent rules become explicit actualities of everyday life as soon as we begin to go through our own experiences with insight into their real character and consciously live our lives as specimens of universal life. (Cf. G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*<sup>2</sup> [Leipzig, Teubner, 1931], 51 f.)

their respective partners alone but with all the other pairs as well, the balance is likewise, as we learn from this fragment, a positive one. God is neither like an empty space within which phenomena are allowed to materialize, nor is he an overpowering medium, absorbing variety and melting it down to uniform homogeneity. The comparison with the healthy, vigorous oil certainly implies that God is the most positive factor in whatever happens, a substance lending energy to its own modifications and, though unspecific itself, making them the more specific.<sup>38</sup> Never would Heraclitus, as did the *Upanishads*, describe the One by the all-comprehensive name "No! No!" The God of Heraclitus displays His eternal self by ceaselessly assuming and shedding the contradictions of life.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. the Plutarch passage in note 19.—In comparison with the four other canonic senses, smell has always, up to the present day, attracted least attention on the part both of scientific and speculative investigators. So it is the more surprising that Heraclitus chose just this simile here, and that he likewise refers to smell in the cryptic fragments 7 and 98. There is, I think, an explanation for this choice, though it can only be a conjectural one. According to Plato in *Timaeus* 66d-e (cf. also Aristotle *De Sens.* ch. 5), smells are only given off by things which are being wetted or decomposed or melted or volatilized. Smell therefore is a phenomenon of transition from one state to the next. (I ignore some slight inconsistency in Plato's discussion as to the precise transitions which he has in mind.) Now it is exactly these transitions which constitute, in the view of Heraclitus, the processes of life (way upward: wetting and melting; volatilizing) and death (way downward: precipitation; decomposition) (cf. "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *A.J.P.* LIX [1938], 335). If we date back the substance of Plato's assertion to Heraclitus (unfortunately the data for the Heraclitan theory of evaporation are unreliable and confusing), the resulting idea is that through the organ of smell man is enabled directly to perceive the very processes of life and death. A. E. Taylor (see note 27), in his commentary on the *Timaeus*, p. 471, further explains Plato's views by pointing out that smells are connected only with *γέρεσις*, not with *ὀσμία*. Now it is exactly the phenomena of *γέρεσις* which are likened to the odorbearing spices in Heraclitus frag. 67, in contrast to God's *ὀσμία* which is compared with the oil. In the preparation of perfumes, the liquid oil wets and melts the solid spices (see note 16), takes them upward on the way of life, and bestows vigor and energy on them (see note 19). The symbol, taken in this sense, is perfect.